In this paper, the problem of negotiating an abatement agreement is approached from the perspective of the theory of public goods in a general equilibrium context. Such an approach has the appeal of simultaneously dealing with both equity and efficiency issues. Three major difficulties in...

The amount of cooperation needed to improve the welfare of signatories of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in the presence of market imperfections, depends on the characteristics of pollution. In a dynamic model, the conventional wisdom on the effect of free-riding needs to be...

In this paper, we use the two region CETA-M model to explore some related issues raised by the current interest in CO2 concentration targets as a possible climate change policy objective. First, we identify possible cost and benefit assumptions that would make particular concentration ceilings...

This paper surveys the rapidly growing theoretical literature on international environmental agreements. The surveyed contributions are classified according to the conceivable strategies to create incentives for the participation in and compliance with environmental conventions. The proposed...

International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement, which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The paper analyses this problem from the...

First, the paper lays out the fun-damental assumptions underlying the game theoretical analysis of international environmental problems. Second it summarises important findings which help to explain the difficulties of co-operation and discusses remedies. Chapter 3 looks at measures to avoid...

This paper investigates the implications of progressively broadening the scope of the market of tradable permits from no emissions trading to full global trading. We start with the no emissions trading case where each Annex I country must individually meet its Kyoto targets. Next, we consider a...

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to...

Experience with existing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) shows that trade measures agreed to within the MEAs themselves may not necessarily lead to a dispute between parties. On the contrary, there is a great chance that disputes may arise from national measures undertaken to fulfil...

Economic globalization affects the environment and sustainable development in several ways and through various channels. The purpose of this paper is to review the key links between globalization and the environment. The paper intends to consider the major issues in multilateral economic...