Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and...

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the 'fat tail', on the formation...

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the 'fat tail', on the formation...

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and...

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the...

Asheim et al. (2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.51, pp.93-109) show that participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) can be doubled in a two-region world by the Regional Penance strategy, designating countries that are permitted to punish...

This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision bring significant benefits to countries with through a regional cooperation than a global cooperation. Using a repeated game model, this study shows that the regional cooperative approach is an appropriate way to...

This research aims to relax the condition in which international environmental agreements consists of asymmetric countries are sustained for a long-term, considering a repeated game model and the effect of ancillary benefits. We suppose all countries have the feature of two-sided asymmetry: the...

Without effective developing country participation in climate mitigation it will be impossible to meet global concentration and climate change targets. However, developing countries are unwilling and, in many cases, unable to bear the mitigation cost alone. They need huge transfers of resources...

Recent research has shown that agreements centered on the adoption of breakthrough technologies can break the deadlock in international climate negotiations if the mitigation technology exhibits a network externality that transforms full cooperation into a self-enforcing outcome. This paper...