The Kyoto Protocol's success or failure should be evaluated against the unobserved counterfactual of no treatment. This requires instrumental variables. We find that countries' membership in the International Criminal Court (ICC) predicts Kyoto ratification in a panel model. Both multilateral...

Many Kyoto countries fear a loss of competitiveness due to unilateral climate policyefforts; policymakers therefore call for carbon-related border tax adjustments. With thispaper we attempt to estimate the treatment effect of Kyoto commitment on bilateralexport flows using regression-adjusted...

A country's carbon footprint refers to the CO₂ emissions caused by domestic absorptionactivities. Trade in goods drives a wedge between the footprint and local emissions. Weprovide a panel database on carbon footprints and carbon net trade. Using a differencesin-differences IV estimation...

Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood that links uncertainty about benefits and...

This paper compares the level of uncertainty widely reported in climate change scientific publications with the level of uncertainty of the costs estimates of implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the United States. It argues that these two categories of uncertainties were used and ignored,...

We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that...

We use recent developments in the empirics of comparative case studies to analyze the effect of binding emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol on the development of CO2 emissions of seven major Annex B countries. In particular, we investigate whether committing to a specific greenhouse gas...

We examine a global refunding scheme for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in...

This paper investigates the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated emission permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that, for a net foreign debtor country, the domestic welfare costs of a unilateral domestic...

In this paper I examine the design of climate treaties when there exist two kinds of technology, a conventional abatement technology with (linearly) increasing marginal costs and a backstop technology ('air capture') with high but constant marginal costs. I focus on situations in which countries...