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Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies : substitutes or complements?
Franckx, Laurent (contributor) - In: Topics in economic analysis & policy 2 (2002) 1
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001739529
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The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities
Franckx, Laurent - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 43 (2002) 1, pp. 71-92
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001650857
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Ambient environmental monitoring, sepuential firm inspection and time-decreasing benefits of inspection
Franckx, Laurent (contributor) - In: Economics bulletin : EB (2001)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001697785
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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001724761
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Marginal deterrence through ambient environmental inspections
Franckx, Laurent - In: Scottish journal of political economy : the journal of … 51 (2004) 4, pp. 507-527
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002193820
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Ambient inspections and commitment in environmental enforcement
Franckx, Laurent - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622698
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Environmental enforcement with endogeneous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - In: Environmental & resource economics : the official … 30 (2005) 2, pp. 195-220
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002610461
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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - 2002
We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597940
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Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring
Franckx, Laurent - 2002
We consider an inspection game between $n$ polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335754