We develop a multiple-firm model of an industry's voluntary adoption of environmental protection measures to achieve a predetermined industry-wide emissions reduction target under an explicit threat of imposition of an emissions tax. We examine the free-riding incentive of individual firms and...

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the...

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumers, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by overinvesting to raise the...

It has often been claimed that firms' compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the "Harrington paradox" in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this "stylized fact": Firms are...

Purpose – The domestic institutional context has emerged as a key determinant of firms’ environmental disclosure, but studies have hardly addressed the extent to which exposure to foreign institutional contexts plays a role in the occurrence and contents of non-financial disclosure, crucial...

In June, 2007 the province of Ontario, Canada, released environmental penalties (EPs) regulations. EPs (or administrative penalties, as they are called in the US) are the environmental equivalent of speeding tickets for facilities that violate pollution laws. They are found in numerous...

We extend the economic theory of regulation to allow for strategic self-regulation that preempts political action. When political "entry" is costly for consumer, firms can deter it through voluntary restraints. Unlike standard entry models, deterrence is achieved by over-investing to raise the...

It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”:...

If law were to reorient our analytical framework so that each decision were to include, to the greatest extent possible, adverse environmental consequences, we could institutionalize a process of making sound ecosystem management decisions. One law that was supposedly designed to break...

We introduce an innovative market-based mechanism that may be used to advance environmental goals. Our mechanism employs option theory to give established businesses a financial stake in the success of green technologies. We show why and how green companies should be given an option to transfer...