, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on … relative attractiveness of vacancy referrals increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness …

The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and search unemployment. Sickness appears … movements across labor force states. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and the unemployed … worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified by sickness. The decisions governing labor force …

This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness … sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent sick period among the unemployed are affected by (i) the limit of 300 …

The paper presents a model that allows a unified analysis of sickness absence and search unemployment. Sickness appears … movements across labor force states. The employed worker prefers absence for sufficiently severe sickness and the unemployed … worker may prefer nonparticipation if the disutility of search is amplified by sickness. The decisions governing labor force …