This Written Statement presents aspects in China's corporate governance framework, state corporate ownership and control, and the Chinese Communist Party's roles in corporate governance. It was submitted as part of a testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,...

Mergers lead to larger firms and a less competitive market structure, but their effects on innovation are not clear. Mergers may improve innovation incentives by promoting economies of scope and scale, R\&D activities, and increasing the ability to deal with uncertainties. However, mergers may...

The impact of innovation on mergers has been a subject of debate in merger enforcements. Firms may decide to merge because of increasing market share and expanding capacity. However, mergers may also be motivated by innovation since they provide resources for commercialization of innovation and...

This paper evaluates the recent literature claiming that the US economy has generally become less competitive causing the US economy to perform poorly and that lax antitrust policy is one important reason for the decline in economic performance. Although there certainly are empirical facts...

This paper studies the voluntary provision of public goods that is partially driven by a desire to offset for individual polluting activities. We first extend existing theory and show that offsets allow a reduction in effective environmental pollution levels while not necessarily extending the...

Many Western countries face the challenge of reconciling future labor demand with growing public opposition to immigration. The dynamics and underlying processes of setting immigration requirements remain unclear as research so far mainly focuses on context-specific empirical studies. We use a...

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

We propose a theory of tax centralization and inter governmental grants in politico-economic equilibrium. The cost of taxation differs across levels of government because voters internalize general equilibrium effects at the central but not at the local level. This renders the degree of tax...

We propose a theory of tax centralization in politico-economic equilibrium. Taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are rationally internalized at the federal, but not at the regional level. The political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government....