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We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple leader-follower game. We then explicitly derive the primary dealer's (follower) strategic choice of bids as a function of its customer's (leader) bids and show that an increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012893365
In the US spectrum auctions which allocate radio frequency rights to the private sector, firms are allowed to form multilateral bidding agreements. These agreements explicitly allow bidders to discuss their strategies and bids. Using public auction- and firm-level data from the Federal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345849
We study the interdependency between two markets, where the first involves offering production capacity, while on the second actual production is sold. The key issue is that the expected product market outcome determines the opportunity cost for bidding at the capacity market while the capacity...
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Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-times. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599112
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607074
This paper provides evidence of bounded rationality by large dealers in U.S. Treasury auctions. I argue that these dealers use a heuristic of yield-space bidding which leads to biases manifested in three ways: they submit dominated bids, i.e., those that could be improved without raising the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607087
We model the uniform-price US Treasury security auction as a static symmetric game of incomplete information in which each payer is a primary dealer who submits a demand schedule given two independent sources of private information – his pre-auction short position of the auctioned security,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905263