We model the uniform-price US Treasury security auction as a static symmetric game of incomplete information in which each payer is a primary dealer who submits a demand schedule given two independent sources of private information – his pre-auction short position of the auctioned security,...

We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple leader-follower game. We then explicitly derive the primary dealer's (follower) strategic choice of bids as a function of its customer's (leader) bids and show that an increase...

We study the interdependency between two markets, where the first involves offering production capacity, while on the second actual production is sold. The key issue is that the expected product market outcome determines the opportunity cost for bidding at the capacity market while the capacity...

Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-times. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding...

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...

This paper provides evidence of bounded rationality by large dealers in U.S. Treasury auctions. I argue that these dealers use a heuristic of yield-space bidding which leads to biases manifested in three ways: they submit dominated bids, i.e., those that could be improved without raising the...

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid...

Der langjährige Einsatz und die große Bedeutung des Conservation Reserve Program begründen seine Sonderstellung als marktorientierten Ansatz zur Honorierung von Umweltleistungen. Mit diesem Beitrag wird herausgearbeitet, welche Lehren aus dem Conservation Reserve Program für die...

This paper empirically evaluates two possible sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and that encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters...

This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution of states and (iii) the conditional...