We argue that information asymmetries between regulators and firms increase the administrative decision costs of initiating new policies due to the costs of satisfying evidentiary or “burden of proof” requirements. We further contend that regulators with better information about regulated...

This paper develops a model to explain and analyze the evolution of network structure (connectivity) and design (flight frequency, aircraft size, prices) in the post-deregulation U.S. airline industry. We show that legacy carriers choice of Hub-and-Spoke networks and the emergence of low cost...

The traditionally large and sunk nature of utility investments gives rise to the possibility, if not the likelihood, of opportunistic behavior on the part of either regulators or regulated firms. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to provide insights into this possibility, then employ...

This paper is an empirical assessment of the comparative efficiency of governance structures in an environment marked by high uncertainty. We analyze the short-term impact of retail deregulation on the productive efficiency of electric utilities in the United States. We argue that there are...

This paper traces the process of deregulation in the US natural gas market in the 1970s and 1980s and the restructuring of the gas market in the 1990s. I review the politics behind deregulation and the actions of the FPC and FERC to first regulate the market and then implement the Natural Gas...