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Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - 2009 - This version: February 2009
equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008811385
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Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching model?
L'Haridon, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck; Pérez-Duarte, … - 2011
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. To the best of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009238027
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Monetary Policy Committees : meetings and outcomes
Berk, Jan Marc; Bierut, Beata K. - 2009
Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003867075
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Patent Reform in the United States : Lessons Learned
Burk, Dan L. - 2013
In previous work with Mark Lemley I have discussed the critical role played by the courts in fitting patent law to the ongoing needs of innovation. Careful scrutiny of the recently enacted America Invents Act (AIA), which legislatively reforms American patent law, underscores the need for robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162157
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and infinite policy …; and conversely, any weakly stable set is supported by some equilibrium. If the policy space is well ordered then the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multi-dimensional and … equilibrium. Using these results, we show that minimum-winning coalitions may not form, and that a player who does not propose may … nevertheless earn all of the surplus from agreement. We then consider how equilibrium outcomes change as we vary the order in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
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On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2012
This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We show that in problems where some students cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009566572
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Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042
A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
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Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation
Biró, Péter; Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - 2013
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548
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The Ambivalent Role of Punishment in Post-Merger Coordination and the New Approach of the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Hansen, David - 2013
Threat of punishment is considered a deterrent force, which ensures the sustainability of post-merger tacit coordination. US and EU Agencies, Courts and economists, including those who extend simulation methods to quantify coordinated effects, assume that parties follow grim trigger strategies:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087712