Shelf offerings have become the dominant method of issuing seasoned equity over the last decade. We find that the increased institutional ownership of U.S. public firms and in particular shelf issuers is the key determinant in the shift in SEO issue method over time. The increase in...

In 2012 President Obama signed into law the US Stop Trading On Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act to prohibit federal politicians from trading stocks, based on private information, for personal gain with an accompanying provision that they make public their transactions within 45 days of...

We cross-sectionally analyze the presence of aggregated hidden depth and trade volume in the S&P 500 and identify its key determinants. We find that the spread is the main predictor for a stock's hidden dimension, both in terms of traded and posted liquidity. Our findings moreover suggest that...

We conduct a detailed analysis of investors in successful initial coin offerings (ICOs). The average ICO has 4,700 contributors. The median participant contributes small amounts and many investors sell their tokens before the underlying product is developed. Large presale investors obtain tokens...

Material private information transmits through social networks. Using manually collected information on networks of alumni reunion cohorts, we show that hedge fund managers connected to directors of firms engaged in merger deals increase call option holdings on target firms before deal...

According to the rent-extraction hypothesis, weak corporate governance allows entrenched CEOs to capture the pay-setting process and benefit from events outside of their controlget paid for luck. In this paper, I find that the independence requirement imposed on boards of directors by the...

Using exogenous variation in CEO stock option grants generated by FAS 123R which mandated expensing of employee stock options, we investigate the causal effects of CEO risk incentives (vega) on cash policies of U.S. firms. Employing a difference-in-difference framework, in which we identify...

This paper examines the SEC regulation requiring non-binding general shareholder vote on executive compensation–“say-on-pay” (SOP). We examine the first two years of SOP in the Russell 3000. The results confirm previous shareholder-proposal studies by finding that SOP approval (reject)...

Although corporate finance theory suggests how adverse shocks influence shareholder preferences toward corporate risk-taking and executive compensation, few researchers explore this relationship empirically. We construct a firm-year measure of unexpected shocks to environmental regulatory...