Criminal cartel cases in the U.S. are at modern lows, spurring questions as to whether the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) and the Antitrust Division's criminal enforcement program continue to be effective and, if not, why not? In this Chapter, we offer...

This paper models a key outcome of secret negotiations: partial-leniency fine discounts from plea bargaining in criminal price-fixing cases. Models tested explain up to 52% of variation in percentage discounts. A minor portion is explained by such defendants characteristics as the defendant s...

Consumers suffer from high drug prices, which stem in large part from pharmaceutical companies’ anticompetitive games. This essay discusses the crucial role antitrust enforcement agencies can play in addressing pay-for-delay settlements and product hopping and draws lessons from this...

In Part I of this article, we discuss the importance of the development of economic analysis in US and European competition law to better explain how the choice of economic welfare standard has become the fundamental question of which goal to choose for competition law. This discussion sets up...

The U.S. antitrust enforcement mechanism is criticized for being ill-adapted to ensuring competition in digital platforms. In the U.S., several bills have been introduced in Congress with the aim to create a new antitrust regulatory framework for digital platforms. This paper proposes a...

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. Building on several new datasets, we argue that this decline did not reflect a popular demand for weaker enforcement or any other kind of democratic sanction. The decline was engineered by unelected regulators and judges...

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. We investigate the political causes of this decline by looking at who made the crucial decisions and how strong a popular mandate they had to do so. Using a novel framework to understand the determinants of regulatory and...

We hand-collect and standardize information describing all 3,055 antitrust lawsuits brought by the Department of Justice (DOJ) between 1971 and 2018. Using restricted establishment-level microdata from the U.S. Census, we compare the economic outcomes of a non-tradable industry in states...

The purpose of this paper is to describe the institutions of antitrust enforcement in the United States and to test those institutions against a set of norms used to assess the operations of administrative agencies. The paper is part of a broader project studying global administrative agencies....