This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation...

Previous experiments have found a moderate, positive effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) games. This effect has been typically observed in experiments with groups of size 4 or more, and contrasts with results from n-person prisoner's dilemma and...

In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

This paper studies the design of enforcement policies to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With an ordered-leniency policy, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. By...