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We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264117
We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003605750
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003497568
We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and it is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150814
We study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317070