The aim of the paper is to test two hypotheses: on one hand, the aim is to analyse if firm’s executive rewards can be explained just by the hierarchical structure of the firm (Model One) while on the other we want to study the correlation between the level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)...

The past decades witnessed a broad trend towards flatter organizations with lesshierarchical layers. A reduction of the number of management levels in a corporationcan have both positive and negative effects on firm performance with the neteffect being theoretically unclear ex ante. The present...

The past decades witnessed a broad trend towards flatter organizations with less hierarchical layers. A reduction of the number of management levels in a corporation can have both positive and negative effects on firm performance with the net effect being theoretically unclear ex ante. The...

We examine team diversity and performance using the asset management industry as a laboratory. Employing political affiliation as a proxy, we find ideologically diverse teams perform better than homogeneous teams. The mechanism involves both improved decision-making due to more diverse...

I study the design of dynamic certification schemes for firms that are privately informed about their competence and their efforts towards quality provision. I identify the certifier's tension between disclosing firms' track records to consumers and providing effort incentives to firms, and show...

We examine whether and to what extent managers are evaluated, in their relative performance contracts, on the basis of systematic performance. Focusing on relative total shareholder returns (rTSR), the predominant metric specified in these contracts and used by market participants to evaluate...

This study examines the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firm performance and risk-taking behavior. Agency theory suggests that RPE use in executive compensation plans improves risk sharing and strengthens incentive alignment when firm performance is exposed to common shocks. I...

We study how compensation committees set CEOs' earnings performance goals in annual incentive plans (AIPs) and their implications for managers' strategic earning guidance behavior. We find corporate boards rely on earnings forecasts provided by both financial analysts and managers in setting...

We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting awards on debt financing are greater when the moral hazard problem faced by...

We argue gender-diverse boards are associated with distinct preferences that reassure investors about their commitment to moderate risk and boost long-term corporate survival. Results suggest a strong relation between gender-diverse boards and bondholder-aligned CEO compensation components,...