We provide causal evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) improve the performance of their portfolio companies by replacing founders. Augmenting a database of U.S.-based, VC-backed startups founded from 1995-2008 with hand-collected information regarding turnover, we exploit shocks to the supply...

This paper examines whether agency conflicts during venture capital (VC) fundraising impact investment behavior. Using novel investment-level decisions of VCs in the process of raising new funds, we find that venture capitalists take actions hidden from their investors, i.e. limited partners...

Venture capital (VC) backed firms face neither the governance requirements nor a major separation of ownership and control of their public peers. These differences suggest that independent directors could play a unique role on private firm boards. This paper explores the dynamics of VC-backed...

Venture capital (VC) backed firms face neither the governance requirements nor a major separation of ownership and control of their public peers. These differences suggest that independent directors could play a unique role on private firm boards. This paper explores the dynamics of VC-backed...

This paper studies if and how individual-level patenting activity changes as an employee transitions to entrepreneurial firm founder. Using a large database of employment and innovative histories of over 1110 spinoff firm founders, the empirical strategy tracks both founders and her co-inventors...

We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when control becomes shared, and...