This paper analyses the German corporate law reform's effect on the publicly listed companies' ownership and performance. First, theoretically plausible implications of the most important laws that were issued 1990-2009 are provided, then an empirical analysis using 1997-2008 panel data...

Regulators and governance activists are pressuring firms to abolish CEO duality (the Chief Executive Officer is also the Chairman of the Board). However, the literature provides mixed evidence on the relation between CEO duality and firm performance. Using the exogenous shock of the 1989...

We provide the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between board independence and firm performance in China. We find that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm operating performance in China. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests, including...

This paper examines the economic consequences of the introduction of regulations that mandate listed firms adopt outside directors. The Japanese Companies Act was revised in June 2014, and this revision required listed firms to adopt at least one outside director. Although half of the listed...

Using five empirical methodologies to account for endogeneity issues, this study investigates the effects of board independence and managerial pay on the performance of 169 Saudi listed firms between 2007 and the end of 2014. Studying board independence and managerial pay utilises the main...

The present paper explores the link between bankruptcy law and firms' dynamics, focusing on Italy as a case study. Relying on a previous literature dealing with the concept of entrepreneurship “friendly” bankruptcy law, we stress the idea that bankruptcy institutions, although connected to a...

A substantial number of empirical studies on the linear relationship between executive compensation and firm performance for European firms suggest that the pay-performance sensitivity is not significantly positive. We argue that a nonlinear structure fits the data better, because compensation...

Whereas the agency theory predicts that dual-class shares decrease firm performance, the stewardship theory predicts that dual-class shares increase firm performance. The cumulative findings on the performance consequences of dual-class shares have been weak and/or inconclusive. Because...

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of...

The staggered introduction of Corporate Opportunity Waivers (COWs) in nine US states since 2000 reduced legal risk to directors serving on multiple boards and increased intra-industry board overlap in firms characterized by intensive R&D activity. More board overlap results in a higher return on...