This paper provides a game-theoretic model of network formation with a continuous effort choice. Efforts are strategic complements for direct neighbors in the network and display global substitution/congestion effects. We show that if the parameter governing local strategic complements is larger...

We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky's (J Econ Theory 71:44- 74, 1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive...

We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise...

This paper studies banks' decision to form financial interconnections using a model of financial contagion that explicitly takes into account the crisis state of the world. This allows us to model the network formation decision as optimising behaviour of competitive banks, where they balance the...

We study the formation of multilayer networks where payoffs are determined by the degrees in each network and explore distinct network relationships by allowing for inter-network and intra-network spillovers through five properties: supermodularity and submodularity for internetwork spillovers,...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature of our model is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the “right”...

The urban space paper is introduced by a brief “report” on the founding of Rome by Romulus; he traced a furrow and thereby defined the urban space. The core of the paper, however, defines the urban space by the dimension of collective decision making expressed in the form of voting games. It...

We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents...