Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which...

In this paper, we study a standard Cournot model where firms are able to form bilateral collaboration agreements which lower marginal cost. While a static analysis of such a model can be found in Goyal and Joshi [5], we introduce an evolutionary model. Stable networks (in the static sense)...

We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very general point. Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that agents' utilities differ only with respect to their network position while their names do not...

In this paper, we study a standard Cournot model where firms are able to form bilateral collaboration agreements which lower marginal cost. While a static analysis of such a model can be found in Goyal and Joshi [5], we introduce an evolutionary model. Stable networks (in the static sense)...

We study the evolution of R&D networks in a Cournot model where rms may lower marginal costs due to bilateral R&D collaborations. Stochastically stable R&D networks exhibit the dominant group architecture, and, contrary to the existing literature, generically unique predictions about the size of...

We set out a behavioural model of the stock market in which investors are connected through a social network. Agents may adopt types on the spectrum from pure fundamentalist to arbitrarily strong chartist which they update from their neighbours depending on past performance. Our main analytical...