We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice -- managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future...

The business media disseminates managers' earnings guidance news more broadly or creates new information content on the guidance (Drake et al. 2014). We hypothesize that the media's information dissemination encourages managers to continue issuing earnings guidance because their intended...

We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality — disaggregation quality (DQ) — and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of nonmissing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms' annual...

We inform the policy debate on whether management earnings guidance fosters managerial myopia by examining whether firms providing earnings guidance exhibit less firm innovation. At the core of the debate is whether guidance impedes long-term value creation, and evidence on the association...

We examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of peer firms of hostile takeover targets. We find that peer firms under control threat use a disclosure strategy that emphasizes bad news: they provide more bad news forecasts, tend to bundle bad news forecasts with earnings announcements, use more...

We construct a new, parsimonious, measure of disclosure quality – disaggregation quality (DQ) – and offer validation tests. DQ captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data through a count of non-missing Compustat line items, and reflects the extent of details in firms' annual...