Insiders have private information and often disclose non-GAAP earnings metrics with the claim that such metrics inform investors about earnings persistence. However, because insiders have private information about earnings persistence, they have opportunities to take advantage of this...

There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in...

Beginning in 2018, U.S. public firms were required to report the ratio of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation to their median employee's compensation in the annual proxy statement. We find that this pay ratio disclosure leads to declines in both total compensation and...

Diese Studie untersucht die Übereinstimmung von Erklärungsentsprechen und Entsprechenserklärung bezüglich Ziffer 4.2.3 Abs. 4 S. 1 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK) in den Jahren 2010 bis 2014. Dazu wurden in einer Vollerhebung die Entsprechenserklärungen und Abfindungssummen...

We examine the real effects of disclosing information about the pay gap between the CEO and employees. Firms reporting higher pay ratios tend to include discretionary narrative portraying their employee relations or compensation practices in a positive light. Reporting higher ratios is...

We demonstrate how insider trading analysis may benefit from textual analysis. We analyze reported insider trading behavior and explain the association between corporate as well as 3rd-party news announcements on directors' dealings activity. Previous approaches are extended by adding the...

Disclosure of insider trading are ambiguous pieces of information, as liquidity traders may not assess whether the trades are motivated by significant privileged information related to the true share value. This paper establishes an algorithm, relying on Bayesian inference that represents the...

Based on the German regulatory framework, we provide a more detailed picture about the information disclosure process surrounding the announcement of major shareholdings of hedge funds in listed companies. We separate price and volume effects between three event dates: the transaction date when...

Shareholder activism has been overlooked in Hong Kong (HK) — Asia's global financial centre and the gateway for investors to access the China Mainland markets. The HK Disclosure of Interests regime provides insufficient information on activist investments to the public, as compared to The...

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and...