Showing 1 - 10 of 1,322
This paper examines whether -- in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements -- shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms' exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174566
We investigate how internal information asymmetry affects subordinate managers’ engagement in answering investor questions at interactive disclosure venues. We find that subordinates’ engagement is greater when internal information asymmetry is higher. Additionally, we find that the relation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014351255
This paper explores corporate disclosure in a dynamic oligopoly setting. In each period, a firm receives a signal on market size and must decide whether or not to publicly disclose the information before engaging in price competition in the product market. The main insight here is that firms'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012705802
In this paper, I examine the impact of ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty), alongside that of risk, on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. I confirm the well-known result that an increase in risk— uncertainty over outcomes—is associated with an increase in management guidance (earnings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289131
The primary role of equity compensation is to provide incentives to an effort-averse agent. Here, we show that the chosen level of equity incentives, when publicly disclosed, will also convey information about future earnings, causing two-way linkages between incentive compensation and financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131447
This paper presents a model of voluntary disclosure in which the manager's information about the firm's value is granular, i.e., consists of a large random number of imprecise signals. Using an argument in the spirit of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, we show that there exists a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917933
We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065969
The paper studies incentives of low-quality sellers to disclose negative information about their product. We develop a model where one's quality can be communicated via cheap-talk messages only. This setting limits ability of high-quality sellers to separate as any communication strategy they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869906
Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405002
In this paper, we study the incentives of low-quality sellers to separate them from high-quality sellers. We consider a framework with asymmetric quality information where the only way to communicate quality is via cheap-talk messages. In this framework, any separating strategy pursued by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013213772