This paper examines whether -- in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements -- shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms' exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks,...

This paper explores corporate disclosure in a dynamic oligopoly setting. In each period, a firm receives a signal on market size and must decide whether or not to publicly disclose the information before engaging in price competition in the product market. The main insight here is that firms'...

In this paper, I examine the impact of ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty), alongside that of risk, on firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. I confirm the well-known result that an increase in risk— uncertainty over outcomes—is associated with an increase in management guidance (earnings...

Do credit ratings affect the information content of corporate disclosure? Using novel data on rating analysts to obtain exogenous variation in rating information, we find that greater uncertainty in credit ratings increases the quality of information disclosed by the firm. This is consistent...

We examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information. In our model, a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices. We show (perhaps...

This paper presents a model of voluntary disclosure in which the manager's information about the firm's value is granular, i.e., consists of a large random number of imprecise signals. Using an argument in the spirit of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, we show that there exists a simple...

This study investigates the strategic disclosure of a downstream firm’s information regarding cost-reducing investment in a vertically related industry. Disclosing information affects an (common) upstream firm’s input price (i.e., vertical strategic effects) and a rival downstream firm’s...

Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...

This paper considers a simple hidden action agency problem where the principal has hidden information concerning the agent's utility of cash flow or cash flow, the agent's effort productivity, or the agent's cost of effort. The question is whether the principal should precommit to disclosing...