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We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer …-dimensional. We design two experimental treatments: In the unawareness treatment, the buyer is uncertain about the first dimension …, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015405163
We model firms' quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently ….e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847547
The theory of voluntary disclosure of information posits that market forces lead senders to disclose information … adverse inferences about non-disclosed information. Previous research finds that receivers do not sufficiently infer non-disclosure … that competition between senders positively affects disclosure of information and receivers' welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024603
This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high-performing public companies as well as more troubled companies withhold issuing guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of the guidance, but issuing a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851796
certifiers and the information disclosure of applicants. We show that the inability of a certifier to commit to the amount of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854976
Consider a three-tier industry with a monopolist supplying an essential input to a manufacturer, which in turn sells its product to final consumers through two differentiated retailers. Throughout the supply chain, contracts are linear and secret. In this setting, upon receiving an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827414
willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979703
A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender faces an ex ante quantity-quality tradeoff: sending positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007350
Motivated by the analyst and investor setting we examine the behavior of subjects playing both roles of sender and receiver in an information transmission game. We also elicit the subjects' beliefs of others' strategic behavior, risk and other-regarding preferences. The results of the experiment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038329
This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of other coalitions members being satisfied. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665574