We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...

We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...

While the social and economic impacts of how disclosures are presented are well-understood, it is less clear how disclosure decisions unfold throughout the annual reporting cycle. We study this issue by exploring the experience of interpreting and implementing corporate reporting rules, focusing...

In this study, we examine whether CEOs' stock-based compensation has any relationship with the disclosure of highly proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance their voluntary disclosures in general, we argue...

Insiders have private information and often disclose non-GAAP earnings metrics with the claim that such metrics inform investors about earnings persistence. However, because insiders have private information about earnings persistence, they have opportunities to take advantage of this...

We investigate the relationship between cost stickiness and management earnings forecasts. Prior research suggests that earnings are more volatile for sticky cost firms resulting in greater earnings forecast errors. The greater forecast errors might increase investors' demand for information and...

In a recent article, Professor Robert J. Jackson Jr. investigates the impact of public disclosure on equity dispositions by senior managers at Goldman Sachs. Utilizing previously overlooked data, Jackson finds that disclosure of sales per Securities Exchange Act section 16(a) dampens selling....

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are...

After the SEC mandates the disclosure of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)' compensation in 2006, CFO pay increases significantly relative to CEO pay, particularly in firms most affected by the mandate. CFOs (but not CEOs) are more likely to leave their firms following poor performance. Earnings...