We find that firms are less likely to report an internal control material weakness (as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) in a given year if one of their audit committee members is concurrently on the board of a firm that disclosed a material weakness within the prior three years. We find a...

We examine how performance management practices that render employee accomplishments transparent in an organization depend on employees’ hierarchical level. We consider a principal-agent model of an organization where the principal contracts directly with a group of higher-level agent-workers...

This paper investigates the preferences of a firm's current and future shareholders for the quality of mandated public disclosures in a dynamic setting with real investments. We find that while the firm's investment monotonically increases in disclosure quality, the welfare of the firm's current...

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm's cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm's growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth...

This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor...

In this paper, we distil essential insights about the regulation of financial reporting from the academic literature. The key objective is to synthesize extant theory to provide a basis for evaluating implications of pressures on the regulation of financial accounting following the recent...