We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming — and investment efficiency is lower — when a greater fraction...

We study the choice of disclosure and share repurchase strategies of informed managers using a model that captures how they differentially impact short and long-term stock value. We identify a partial disclosure equilibrium in which firms in the lowest value region neither disclose nor...

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming — and investment efficiency is lower — when a greater fraction...

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm's investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long-term stakes in the firm,...