I derive a firm's optimal public disclosure policy aimed at minimizing its cost of raising capital from the equity market. Following the public disclosure, the institutional investors offer incentive contracts to their buy-side analysts to acquire independent private information. Due to the...

A matching platform elicits information about two customers' (quality) types and decides how to disclose that information. The platform intends to persuade the customers to form a match, knowing that adverse selection may occur (and undermine matchmaking) when the customers are uncertain about...

We analyze information disclosure as a policy instrument for contagion management indecentralized environments. A benevolent planner (e.g., the government) tests a fraction ofthe population to learn the infection rate. Individuals meet randomly and exert vigilanceeffort. Efforts factor in a...

I study a sequential first-price auction where two items are sold to two bidders with private binary valuations. A seller, prior to the second auction, can publicly disclose some information about the outcome of the first auction. I characterize equilibrium strategies for various disclosure...

We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of...