We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice -- managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future...

This paper contributes to the debate on the consequences of increased disclosure regulation by investigating the effects of expedited reporting requirements of Form 4 filings, mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), on the market response to earnings announcements. We first confirm that SOX...

We examine the disclosure choice faced by managers when a previously-issued earnings forecast becomes inaccurate. In some cases, managers explicitly update the forecast with a revised earnings estimate, while in other cases, managers withdraw the original forecast without providing an update. We...

This paper examines whether issuing management earnings guidance motivates a firm to raise its level of performance. The failure of management to attain a forecast may reflect poorly on its industry understanding, knowledge of the firm, and management capability. Accordingly, we hypothesize and...

We investigate whether mandatory earnings announcement date forecasts are informative to investors and the informational tradeoffs between mandatory and voluntary forecasts. We find: (i) The percentages of the quarter's earnings news conveyed by mandatory China and voluntary US forecasts are...

We define a delayed disclosure ratio (DD) as the fraction of 10-Q financial statement items that are withheld at the earlier quarterly earnings announcement. We find that higher DD firms have a greater delay in investor and analyst response to earnings surprises: (i) the fraction of total market...

Despite the increased frequency of analyst forecasts during earnings announcements, empirical evidence on the interaction between the information in the earnings announcement and these forecasts is limited. We examine the implications of reinforcing and contradicting analyst forecast revisions...

We examine the consequences of a management earnings forecast regulation implemented in a staggered manner. The regulation substantially increases the directly affected firms' frequency of management forecasts. Nevertheless, approximately 14% of the directly affected firms fail to comply with...

We compare non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements and proxy statements using hand-collected data from SEC filings. We find that proxies for capital market incentives (contracting incentives) are more highly associated with disclosure of non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements (proxy...