We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...

We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for...

While the social and economic impacts of how disclosures are presented are well-understood, it is less clear how disclosure decisions unfold throughout the annual reporting cycle. We study this issue by exploring the experience of interpreting and implementing corporate reporting rules, focusing...

In this study, we examine whether CEOs' stock-based compensation has any relationship with the disclosure of highly proprietary information. While prior studies suggest that stock-based compensation provides managers with an incentive to enhance their voluntary disclosures in general, we argue...

Insiders have private information and often disclose non-GAAP earnings metrics with the claim that such metrics inform investors about earnings persistence. However, because insiders have private information about earnings persistence, they have opportunities to take advantage of this...

We examine the efficacy of proxy voting to limit inflated CEO pay. We find that the percentage of dissenting votes that go against director-sponsored compensation proposals increases following a staggered rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (RIDD), which increases CEOs’ job...

We investigate the association between risk-taking incentives provided by stock-based compensation arrangements and non-GAAP financial disclosures. Controlling for compensation to stock price sensitivity, we find that managers with higher compensation to stock volatility sensitivity (vega) are...

In a recent article, Professor Robert J. Jackson Jr. investigates the impact of public disclosure on equity dispositions by senior managers at Goldman Sachs. Utilizing previously overlooked data, Jackson finds that disclosure of sales per Securities Exchange Act section 16(a) dampens selling....

In recent years, companies have begun to voluntarily disclose alternative measures of CEO compensation. These figures differ — sometimes significantly — from those reported in the summary compensation tables of the annual proxy. The motivation to report this information, however, is not...

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...