by high-ability managers; and, 3) Disclose non-GAAP earnings more aggressively. Importantly, we also find that these … insider sales enable managers to avoid statistically significant negative abnormal returns. Our research demonstrates the …

investors' uncertainty about managers' incentives and reporting objectives. Employing a difference-in-differences design and …

models focus on managers' discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital … market. Earnings management models, on the other hand, concentrate on managers' discretion in deciding how to bias their … mandatory disclosure. By analyzing managers' disclosure strategy when disclosure is voluntary and not necessarily truthful, we …

reduce the demand for conservative financial reporting after replacing managers in the reveal of restatements. Design …, when restating firms make replacement decisions for managers following restatements, they would demand less conservative …

whether individual managers play an economically significant role in voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Tracking … managers across firms over time, we find top executives exert unique and economically significant influence (manager … firm- and time-specific effects. We further show that managers' unique disclosure styles are associated with observable …

reporting the average pay of directors, this regulatory policy provides a unique opportunity to examine managers' incentives to …