The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of whom wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins...

This experimental study investigates two bargaining games with twosided incomplete information between a seller and a buyer. In the first game with no outside options many subjects do not use the incomplete information to their advantage as predicted. We find that a model with adjusting priors...

In Dictator Game experiments where the information status of the recipient varies we find that a certain type of donator tends to reduce his offer when the recipient has incomplete information about the pie size. This result provides new evidence on those approaches on altruism, which assume...

This paper analyzes the implications of currency crises in a model with unique equilibrium. Starting from a typical multiple equilibria model with self-fulfilling expectations we introduce noisy information, following Morris/Shin (1999). Under certain conditions for the noise parameter, all...

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Der Beitrag sollte verdeutlichen, dass sich seit den Pioniermodellen mit unvollständiger Information mittlerweile eine recht heterogene Klasse von Ansätzen etabliert hat, die sich unter alternativen Grundannahmen mit der Frage auseinandersetzen, ob Unternehmen angesichts diverser...

This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange between firms in the presence of demand uncertainty which applies to firms in new industries and insecure regions or markets. We replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used because of its...

We discuss (dis)incentives for fair cooperation related to delegating macroprudential policy decisions to a supranational body, as well as their welfare implications. The question is studied by means of a signaling game of imperfect information between two national regulators. The model...

Numerous laboratory experiments show that workers reciprocate to high wages with high effort, when there is perfect information on the surplus created. Recent field experiments, however, suggest that trust and reciprocity may be lower or absent when the information is incomplete. We report a...

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...