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An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies

Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Nardi, Chiara; … - 2014

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395127

Cognitive empathy in conflict situations

Gauer, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph - 2016

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412685

Cycles of distrust : an economic model

Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzy, Alexander - 2012

We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially … a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, spirals of distrust and conflict get … this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic conflict and international war, and how it also emerges in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009573260

Optimism and commitment : an elementary theory of bargaining and war

Ponsatí, Clara; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 157-179

We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506420

The fragility of deterrence in conflicts

Denter, Philipp; Sisak, Dana - 2013 - This version: October 2012

We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009791545

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2013

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317

Unawareness, beliefs and games

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853

Subjective expected utility in games

Di Tillio, Alfredo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 287-323

This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700273

Cultural transmission with incomplete information : parental perceived efficacy and group misrepresentation

Della Lena, Sebastiano; Panebianco, Fabrizio - 2019

This paper introduces incomplete information in the standard model of cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We allow parents to ignore own group size and the efficiency of their cultural transmission technology, while receiving a feedback from their children. Using the selfconfirming...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987110

Identification in discrete choice models with imperfect information

Gualdani, Cristina; Sinha, Shruti - 2023

We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014309143

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