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Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information

Fudenberg, Drew - In: Game-theoretic models of bargaining, (pp. 73-98). 1985

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001260238

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

Fudenberg, Drew - In: Journal of economic theory 54 (1991) 1, pp. 26-47

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001105656

The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

Fudenberg, Drew - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 62 (1994) 5, pp. 997-1039

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001252914

Topologies on types

Dekel-Tabak, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703019