We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence...

We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with a variant where the signal-generating mechanism is subject to stochastic perturbations. In the theoretical part, we obtain a unique equilibrium with stochastic signals. This equilibrium is separating and has intuitive comparative-static...

Incomplete information, local interaction and random matching games all share a common structure. A type or player interacts with various subsets of the set of all types/players. A type/player's total payoff is additive in the payoffs from these various interactions. This paper describes a...

We introduce a novel method to elicit strategies in indefinitely repeated games and apply it to games of strategic substitutes and complements. We find that out of 256 possible unit recall machines (and 1024 full strategies) participants could use, only five machines are used more than 5 percent...

The housing rental market offers a unique laboratory for studying price stickiness. This paper is motivated by two facts: 1. Tenants' rents are remarkably sticky even though regular and expected recontracting would, by itself, suggest substantial rent flexibility. 2. Rent stickiness varies...

This paper studies how hiding sunk cost of investment would affect investment strategies in a duopoly. The investment would improve profit. If this improvement is larger for the first mover than the second mover, this study finds a unique symmetric equilibrium for a subset of such cases. On the...

This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We review and synthesize recent work on global games, beauty contests, and their applications. We...

This paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, but is the opposite...

Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...

We study experimentally "partnership protocols" of the sort proposed by Kalai and Kalai (2010), for bilateral trade games with incomplete information. We utilize the familiar game analyzed by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Sattherwaite (1983), with a buyer and seller with value...