This note demonstrates that symmetric 3x3 supermodular games may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in these games is known to be independent of the noise structure, our result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games...

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3x3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that extends the one-shot deviation principle. Using...

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...