Showing 261 - 270 of 270
Using sector-level survey data for the universe of Japanese firms, we establish the positive co-movement in the firm’s expectations about aggregate and sector-specific demand shocks. We show that a simple model with imperfect information on the current aggregate and sector-specific components...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241100
Anchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191577
I derive a refinement of sequential equilibria of a noncooperative bargaining game when one player has incomplete … belief over types) of the subgame perfect equilibria corresponding to the extrema of the set of types that survive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237072
In this paper, we investigate behavior in two-player sequential-move contests with complete and incomplete information about the value of the prize, theoretically and experimentally. First, we describe a Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential contest in which both players have private prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237552
Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players' (common) prior on the network in a setting where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225113
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141
We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262083
We show that even in very simple oligopolies with differential information a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. However, we find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052540
This paper proposes a model of how biased individuals update beliefs in the presence of informational ambiguity. Individuals are ambiguous about the actual signal-generating process and interpret signals according to the model that can best support their biases. This paper provides a complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013234442
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path …. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs equilibria rest on ad hoc restrictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061709