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All-Stage Strong Correlated Equilibrium

Heller, Yuval - 2011

A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205603