Showing 1 - 10 of 464
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to … higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240317
We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are … desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define … restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009782099
This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700273
We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on the latter's abilities, which are private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000
We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319
We define and analyze a "strategic topology" on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780874
In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824364
Kolmogorov's extension theorem provides a natural mapping from the space of coherent hierarchies of an agent's first-order, second- order, etc. beliefs to the space of probability measures over the exogenous parameters and the other agents' belief hierarchies. Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569068
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702628