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Sequential bargaining with pure common values

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492

Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul - 2006

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493

Intrahousehold allocations by mothers to children : the role of observability

Banerjee, Debosree; Klasen, Stephan - 2018

In this article we analyse the impact of spousal preference expectations on mothers' willingness to invest in children’s food/nutrition and health/medical expenses. We use a survey conducted in Karnataka, South India, where women with children were asked to state their investment preference in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011883859

The good, the bad and the complex : product design with imperfect information

Asriyan, Vladimir; Foarta, Dana; Vanasco, Victoria - 2018

This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In our model, a consumer can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. While the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065103

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325591

Simultaneous signaling in elimination contests

Zhang, Jun - 2008

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in … final round. I analyze this signaling effect and characterize the equilibrium in this game. Compared to the benchmark model …, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290360

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Bargaining Under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem

von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2011

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051881

Decentralized Screening : Coordination Failure, Multiple Equilibria and Cycles

Gehrig, Thomas; Stenbacka, Rune - 2007

We explore the inter-temporal effects of the pool externalities caused by imperfect screening in competitive credit markets. We find that imperfect screening may, depending on the parameters of the model, generate excessive screening, inefficient duplication of screening or screening cycles....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223728