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We study learning in finitely repeated 2x2 normal form games, when players have incomplete information about their … results show that the success in learning the opponent's type depends on the characteristics of the true game. The learning … equilibrium and we observe no correlation between equilibrium play and learning about the game …
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We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...
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We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065313
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The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact...
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