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On the virtues of privatization when government is benevolent

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 64 (2007) 1, pp. 17-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003519351

Incomplete contracts. : Non-contractible quality, and renegotiation

Lülfesmann, Christoph (contributor) - In: Contributions to theoretical economics 1 (2001) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001707951

When should we privatize? : An incomplete-contracts approach

Lülfesmann, Christoph - In: Journal of financial management and analysis : … 11 (1998) 1, pp. 20-31

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001255397

When should we privatize? : an incomplete-contracts approach

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993125

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001710388

Benevolent government, managerial incentives, and the virtues of privatization

Lülfesmann, Christoph - 2002

We show that privatization can be beneficial even if the government is rational and benevolent, and if the firm's economic and informational environment is independent of the governance structure. The model assumes that wage contracts between the firm's owner (government or private entrepreneur)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597691