I study dynamic private provision of public goods (or bads) when agents (or countries) can invest in cost-reducing technologies and sign incomplete contracts. The model leads to a dynamic common pool problem that is more severe than its static counter-part. Nevertheless, a sequence of short-term...

I develop a dynamic model of costly private provision of public goods where agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies. Despite the n+1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the (Markov perfect) equilibrium unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete...

I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...

I study dynamic private provision of public goods (or bads) when agents (or countries) can invest in cost-reducing technologies and sign incomplete contracts. The model leads to a dynamic common pool problem that is more severe than its static counter-part. Nevertheless, a sequence of short-term...

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer...

We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to...