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rents can be used to provide incentives. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an employment … interaction. Therefore, reciprocity-based and repeated-game incentives are dynamic substitutes, but complements at any given point …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718616
joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other (team incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852752
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström were awarded the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their path breaking work.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages … incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Then, a longer remaining time horizon increases the … employer’s commitment. Generally, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should thus optimally be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on … his career. I also show that more competition might magnify the use of reciprocity-based incentives, and that a formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237
We consider a relational contracting model in which the parties choose to allocate authority either to the principal (centralization) or to the agent (delegation). The party who has authority chooses a project, and the agent exerts effort to successfully execute the project. Delegation generates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839948
We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020