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This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018191
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral … incentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström were awarded the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their path breaking work.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
This paper analyzes a multitask Principal-Agent model in which the performance measures of some tasks are subjective and relational contract is needed for incentive provision. We find that rewarding the Agent based on a subjective measure that aggregates performance on multiple tasks can help...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928349
provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages … incentives promising a bonus in exchange for effort are more effective. Then, a longer remaining time horizon increases the … employer’s commitment. Generally, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should thus optimally be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on … his career. I also show that more competition might magnify the use of reciprocity-based incentives, and that a formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237