Showing 1 - 10 of 41
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478926
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478945
In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972
Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927732
In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008615
There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad when there is adverse selection. Using the dual theory of choice under risk, we are able to fully characterize both the competitive and the monopoly market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008696
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669259
In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669273
We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669286