Showing 1 - 9 of 9
In general in organizations whose system of governance involves weighted majority voting, power and voting weight differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analyzing this difference. This paper provides new algorithms for computing the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368542
Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very widely applied, in part because of the difficulty of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368783
This paper assesses the indices against a set of reasonable criteria in terms of shareholder voting power and the control of the corporation in a large cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is much variation in the distribution of voting shares...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146829
This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146837
In general in an organization whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ. Power indices provide a means of analyzing this difference. The paper uses new algorithms for computing power indices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005146902
We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178308
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K 3 alternatives and n 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747062
Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body in which different members have different numbers of votes. Although this approach to the measurement of power, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time its empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748205
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Typically the largest shareholder in any large listed company is likely to own a voting minority of the shares. Majority ownership by a single...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005583057