I find venture capitalists' (VCs') information production activities help decrease uncertainty about the valuations of new innovations within public equity markets, resulting in price convergence within the cross-section of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) that are backed by different classes of...

Suppose entrepreneurs within venture capital markets accept 'lower than reservation prices' from reputable venture capitalists (VCs). This study shows negative relations between project prices and VCs' reputation ('reputation price discounts') are best explained by presence of an ability measure...

Conventional implementations of the Bonacich (1987) status construct are derived from economic agents' `information reach' and `frequency of repeated partnerships'. This study finds status that derives from new entrant venture capitalists' (VCs') information reach and frequency of repeated...

This paper provides evidence that venture capitalists' (VCs') market reputation consists of two components: an expected component derived from "expectations about VCs' ability to deliver relatively safe ventures to market" and an unexpected component derived from "unanticipated improvements in...

This study finds specification of minimum portfolio returns to be delivered by VCs in contracts that subsist between VCs and their principals is not a necessary condition for incentivization of optimal portfolio performance. Within populations of VCs who are characterized by risk aversion,...

Typically, studies of efforts of economic agents do not distinguish between efforts that directly generate returns (`return effort') and efforts that facilitate demonstration of return effort, that is, `return effort cost'. This study provides formal theoretical evidence that a distinguishing of...

This study develops a general equilibrium model within which self revelation of ability - that is not accompanied by any signaling - is compatible with arrival at rational expectations equilibriums (REE). In the model, economic agents either are 'confident', 'overconfident', or 'under-confident'...

Suppose absence of agency problems in interactions between a representative angel investor who already is invested in a project (a 'pre-existing' angel investor), and a representative `entering' venture capitalist who provides a new infusion of capital into the same project. This study finds...