I contribute to the theory of entangled political economy by showing how entanglement can be characterized in terms of political property rights. A political property right grants its holder a share of decision-making power in a specific context, as well as specifies to whom the costs and...

Most liberal constitutional theorizing, as exemplified by Buchanan (1975) and Rawls (1971), treats societies as closed systems of human interaction. This treatment is carried forward by emphasizing the similarity between choosing constitutional rules and choosing the rules for playing a parlor...

What is self-governance, and under what sets of institutions is it possible? We explore this question from the perspective of informal (de facto) constitutionalism. The dominant approach, grounded in formal constitutionalism, overlooks crucial institutional features that determine whether...

This paper explores James Buchanan's contributions to monetary economics and argues these contributions form the foundation of a robust monetary economics paradigm. While often not recognized for his contributions to monetary economics, Buchanan's scholarship offers important insights for...

This paper makes a simple but underappreciated point: due to the open-ended nature of constitutional entrepreneurship, the personal characteristics of constitutional entrepreneurs — intellect, will, virtues and vices, etc. — directly bear on constitutional change. The paper demonstrates this...

Most liberal constitutional theorizing, as exemplified by Buchanan (1975) and Rawls (1971), Operates with a two-level scheme of analysis. The first level entails agreement on the rules through which a polity is constituted; the second level entails self-interested action inside that framework of...