Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 527
Cover Image
Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2008
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal … motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that … sources of incentives to best induce effort from the agent. Analyzing extended versions of the model allows us to examine how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264451
Cover Image
Employee stock options
Børsum, Øystein - 2010
An entrepreneur with information about firm quality seeks financing from an uninformed investor in order to pay a worker. I show that if the worker, too, knows the true quality of the firm, then certain long term wage agreements can credibly signal firm quality. Such wage agreements have a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285589
Cover Image
Binary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion
Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp - 2010
, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286686
Cover Image
Binary payment schemes: moral hazard and loss aversion
Herweg, Fabian; Müller, Daniel; Weinschenk, Philipp - 2010
, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662594
Cover Image
Employee stock options
Børsum, Øystein - 2010
An entrepreneur with information about firm quality seeks financing from an uninformed investor in order to pay a worker. I show that if the worker, too, knows the true quality of the firm, then certain long term wage agreements can credibly signal firm quality. Such wage agreements have a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655549
Cover Image
Binary Payment Schemes : Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
Herweg, Fabian - 2010
, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137958
Cover Image
Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects
Kaniel, Ron - 2020
Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
Cover Image
Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904639
Cover Image
Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach
Li, Chen - 2019
This paper develops an empirical approach to explicitly test two multi-agent moral hazard models on executive compensation in S&P 1500 firms, which distinguish between a team perspective and an individual perspective. This approach assesses which model is more robust at rationalizing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899926
Cover Image
Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948