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Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
An entrepreneur with information about firm quality seeks financing from an uninformed investor in order to pay a worker. I show that if the worker, too, knows the true quality of the firm, then certain long term wage agreements can credibly signal firm quality. Such wage agreements have a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285589
An entrepreneur with information about firm quality seeks financing from an uninformed investor in order to pay a worker. I show that if the worker, too, knows the true quality of the firm, then certain long term wage agreements can credibly signal firm quality. Such wage agreements have a low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008655549
. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …. This upper bound is higher than that of lower-paid managers and all managers in small firms. Shareholders could experience …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904639
. The results favor the team perspective under which unilateral shirking is assumed infeasible for managers. The analysis …-based measures of agency costs. The risk premium can explain up to 37% of total compensation for higher-paid managers in large firms …. This upper bound is higher than that of lower-paid managers and all managers in small firms. Shareholders could experience …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899926
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing … selection and moral hazard on equity prices. We find that managers select contracts based on their private information … contract and is reflected in stock prices. We refer to this as the sorting effect. Additionally, we find that managers do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036078
positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing … selection and moral hazard on equity prices. We find that managers select contracts based on their private information … contract and is reflected in stock prices. We refer to this as the sorting effect. Additionally, we find that managers do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036841
This paper revisits the concept of entrepreneurship, which is frequently neglected in mainstream economics, and discusses the importance of defining and isolating this concept in the context of large, publicly held companies. Compensating for entrepreneurial services in such companies, ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181690