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Pay of political directors in China
Wang, Xiaoming; Xu, Tingting - In: Pacific-Basin finance journal 74 (2022), pp. 1-15
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013389293
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Stock-based compensation plans and employee incentives
Zábojník, Ján - 2014
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
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Call-Option Compensation and the Manager's Intertemporal Risk-Taking Behavior
Romaniuk, Katarzyna - 2012
This paper derives continuous-time conditions for a manager compensated with a call option to increase risk-taking. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099580
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Effects of Compensation Contracts Disclosure on Executive Behavior
Oh, Joonghwa - 2020
effect of market competition and find that a manager works less in a more competitive environment when compensation contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837998
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Intermediated Asymmetric Information, Compensation, and Career Prospects
Kaniel, Ron - 2020
Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842301
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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
Chaigneau, Pierre - 2017
We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704
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Clawback Enforcement, Executive Pay, and Accounting Manipulation
Remesal, Alvaro - 2020
enforcement reduces the need for long-term compensation to avoid the manager's manipulation incentives. However, clawback adoption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851392
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Managerial Compensation and Outcome Volatility
Chen, Xiaoyan - 2018
We present a simple discrete-time version of the continuous-time agency model under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties, which conveniently captures a number of important properties of optimal contracts without having to rely on complex continuous-time mathematical issues. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924934
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Equilibrium Executive Compensation
Chemla, Gilles; Rivera, Alejandro; Shi, Liyan - 2021
We examine a general equilibrium dynamic economy in which each firm i) hires a manager who can divert cash flows and ii …) can fire him after poor performance, generating costs to both parties.The contract is terminated when the manager … decrease with the firm's discount rate and the manager's termination cost and increase with the manager's discount rate, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013223925
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CEO Overconfidence, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Manipulation
Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey) - 2015
In the wake of recent financial crises and corporate failures, chief executive officers (CEOs) are often blamed for their overconfidence leading to earnings manipulation and excessive risks. Why is it then that these overconfident CEOs obtain job offers in the first place? This paper presents a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036600